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CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien & Michael Clarke, Eds.
Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

1986. Pp. 322. $12.95 (paper), $39.50 (cloth).
Controversiesin EnvironmentalPolicy contains thirteen articles in six
sections edited by three commentators and, considered as a whole, suffers
from a "too many cooks" syndrome. If this book is designed to supplement student reading, then the complementary core reading and lectures
have the burden of providing much of the intellectual rigor that several
of these articles assume or, in a few cases, presume. If designed for
trained professionals, this book casts ancient conflicts into current dialogue. In any case, this book would be difficult at best and misleading
at worst for uninitiated novitiates. A love of political debate would aid
the reader for Controversies in Environmental Policy is about politics
even though some of the authors vendre des canardsa moitie their politics
as economics.
The first chapter, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy" by
Dean E. Mann, discusses in a crazy quilt survey of views of the Reagan
Administration and the fragmentation of the political process. In short,
the Reagan Administration's soul might have been willing to vanquish
environmentalism but its political body has proved to be too weak to
overcome the balance created by the separation of powers between the

executive and legislative branches. Ideology may be fun for politicians,
political scientists, commentators and ordinary folks to debate but ideology is really not a good way to run a government.
John Baden and Dean Lueck attempt in the second chapter, "Bringing
Private Management to the Public Lands: Environmental and Economic

Advantages," to apply a theory that works well for the production of
pushpins to the management of resources for which imperfect, if any,
markets exist. Vast tracts of public resources are not marginal, fungible
items and market theory has little real to say about how to manage them.

Baden and Lueck seem to be more concerned with pandering to the
imagery of a passing political fad than discussing the limits of their
proposal. All policy proposals have limits and Baden and Lueck go well

beyond the pale of microeconomics in proposing the divestment of federal
lands in Urban areas and eventually the larger, more remote wilderness

tracts. Nothing in their polemic draws an objective distinction between
the privatization of, say for the sake of argument, the federal Gateway
National Recreation Area at the edge of New York City and the priva-
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tization of the nonfederal but nonetheless public Triborough Bridge and
Tunnel Authority, which controls four bridges and two tunnels in the New
York metropolis.
Baden and Lueck seem to conclude that since there are deficiencies in
governmental management that private management would at least produce a net increase in the economic yield or value of resources. This
general proposition is false although some special cases might exist. A
change in management from public to private would create a change in
the mix of images, goods, services and resource structures. Whether
efficiency, which Baden and Lueck confuse with Pareto Optimality ("the
allocation of scarce resources so that no one can be made better off without
making someone else worse off" [page 54]), would be increased or
decreased by any such change in management is simply problematical.
The third chapter is "From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" by William C. Dennis and Randy T.
Simmons. This chapter's theme is that "When authority is separated from
responsibility, the vital information link between actions and effects is
severed" (page 71). Dennis and Simmons then go on to say that "Even
the most carefully drawn bureaucratic rules and regulations are vague,
not really subject to scientific analysis, and ultimately require subjective
decisions disguised with rhetoric, about due process and objective standards" (page 74). They conclude by urging privatization, more extensive
charging of user fees and deregulation. "From Illusion to Responsibility"
is another example of trying to overextend what might otherwise be
reasonable ideas. That Dennis and Simmons transform analysis into absurdity is demonstrated by at least three propositions in their chapter.
One such transformation is their argument that "A policy area where
the misapplication of scientific principles is likely to do much harm is
the regulation of federal oil, gas, and coal through the leasing process"
(page 74). Dennis and Simmons use as their example that "These leases
contain 'diligence' clauses requiring that the resources be developed in
a certain amount of time or the lease reverts to the government" (page
74). Practically all private leases contain a similar if not identical provision
for reversion to the landowner because it is in the interest of the landowner,
whether public or private, to place a time-frame on activities which might
take place on the property and also to accelerate the landowner's cash
flow if production is ever to take place. Dennis and Simmons in suggesting
that useful speculation is stymied by diligence clauses in public leases
fail to explain why public administrators should be precluded from a
management tool used by private landowners.
A second example of the absurdity propounded by Dennis and Simmons
is their criticism that "Land sales and exchanges are complicated by fair
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market value requirements which, in effect, prohibit any sale or exchange
of federal land to private parties or between governmental agencies without extensive assessment of the economic potential of the land" (page
79). Any prudent manager, whether in the public or private sectors of
the economy, would always attempt to measure, even roughly if precision
were not possible, the fair market value of any land to be sold or traded.
To do otherwise would be an abdication of the manager's duty as the
trustee for the owners. This fundamental duty, which is obvious to anybody who has ever been charged with carrying out a trust, seems to have
escaped the attention of Dennis and Simmons.
The incompetency of Dennis and Simmons is further suggested by their
statements that "There is the serious question of whether it is at all
appropriate for people to use the power of a democratic, constitutional
government to impose their values on society through the allocation of
natural resources" (page 82) and "Nor can liberty be furthered by a public
policy devoted to central management of the nation's natural resources"
(page 82). These statements demonstrate that Dennis and Simmons have
never bothered to read the United States Constitution, in particular Article
IV, Section 3, Paragraph 2 which states: "The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State."
Howard E. McCurdy discusses in the fourth chapter, "Environmental
Protection and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond," the importance of participatory democracy. McCurdy is correct
in stating that "Privatization reforms would substantially reduce the opportunity for public participation" (page 86) and that "None of these
reforms adequately responds to the technical complexity of modem environmental problems nor to the need for increased intergovernmental
cooperation" (page 86). McCurdy outlines briefly the political history of
the urge for privitization and explains as well as, and perhaps more
succinctly than, any other writer that the true bone of contention in the
conflict between the "new federalists" and federal resource management
proponents is the capture of public resources by special interests.
The fifth chapter is "Economism, Democracy and Hazardous Wastes:
Some Policy Considerations" by Michael F. Sheehan who discusses the
limitations of "economism," which he defines as "the belief that the
economic goals and principles espoused by the neoclassical economic
paradigm ought to be the major determinants of public policy" (page
110). He then outlines the statutory structure for the management of
hazardous wastes and develops a seven point program for reform that
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would seek to "substantially reduce the use and proliferation of hazardous
materials through a conscious federal policy of source limitations and the
encouragement of [recovery, recycling and reduction)" (page 125). Sheehan's seven point program is worthy of consideration by legislators and
other policymakers.
Joseph P. Biniek describes accurately in the sixth chapter, "BenefitCost Analysis: An Evaluation," the inaccuracy of the benefit-cost analysis
process. Although he refers to the documentary history of benefit-cost
analysis in the federal water project establishment, Biniek fails unfortunately to make explicit for the novice that benefit-cost analysis was
developed as a means to rank economically, independent of Congressional
District politics, water projects as public investments. As I understand
the original development of benefit-cost analysis, there was a consensus
that it could sort out that this particular dam wasted less money than that
levee and that as a public investment the dam project could be undertaken,
notwithstanding the dubious validity of any supposed net benefits, because
the local community would benefit from the infusion of funds and at least
a few people preferred water skiing to white water canoeing. Aside from
these practical considerations, economists through three decades of pondering and scribbling and government research contracts concluded that

there was no one method to rank projects. Choices, such as the method
of discount, must be made in creating the theoretical model through which
a particular project would be analyzed and these choices, some of which
were subtle and beyond the ken of anybody but economists, made a

difference in the order of project rankings. In other words, even if the
authors of benefit-cost analyses were using accurate numbers for their
calculations (which is a charitable assumption), the benefit-cost ratios
that were derived were inherently ambiguous. Thus, the theory of benefitcost analysis, while highly developed, never became a particularly meaningful tool for objective analysis.
The problems of benefit-cost analysis became even more compounded
when it became a requirement in the evaluation of the Environmental
Protection Agency's regulatory programs on which Biniek's evaluation
focuses. While there are benefits and costs to regulatory programs and,
I suppose, a regulation might be analogous to a dam, there are at least
two important distinctions that need to be recognized. First, the costs of
pollution regulations are by-and-large incurred as private, not public,
expenditures. The significance of this distinction is that, while the deficiencies of benefit-cost analysis are largely irrelevant to the government's
freedom to use the public fisc as a vehicle to provide welfare payments
under the guise of encouraging economic development, pollution regulations do not have as direct purposes the infusion of funds into local
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communities or the serving as tools of macroeconomic adjustment. The
historic rationale for benefit-cost analysis is simply inappropriate for the
evaluation of pollution regulations. Secondly, with the divorce of the
method from its rationale of sorting projects and the marriage of benefitcost analysis to the evaluation of governmental programs in absolute rather
than relative terms, the focus of the analysis moved from moderately
defensible conclusions to even less defensible assertions. The ambiguous
ranking of projects using an arbitrary, or amorphous at best, calculus may
have some worth, but the value generated by that calculus for one program
has virtually no meaning at all. Perhaps the drafters of benefit-cost analyses should append to their reports a statement, much like the disclaimer
at the end of many cinema films, to the effect that any resemblance to
reality is coincidental.
The seventh chapter, "EPA's Successes and Failures" by Alfred A.
Marcus, has a muddled discussion of the economics of pollution abatement but contains some useful insights into the politics of the Environmental Protection Agency. Marcus attempts to argue the superiority of
so-called cost-effective methods as contrasted with direct regulation. Although significant analytical arguments in support of Marcus' preference
exist, he fails to marshal them effectively. He even erroneously defines
"efficiency" as "the greatest good for the greatest number" (page 153).
The problem with Marcus' economics is that he provides no analytical
structure on which to coordinate the diverse and sometimes conclusionary
data and observations that he presents. This weakness in intellectual rigor
is a reflection of the inartfulness of the public debate regarding the economic consequences of pollution control. The policy process, which works
reasonably well but needs to work even better, can succeed notwithstanding various technical failings. An important clue is provided by Marcus'
summary of the public opinion poll literature which reveals very strong
public support for pollution control even in the face of adverse economic
consequences. This seeming paradox is one of the limits of partial economic analysis that might otherwise masquerade as completely holistic
political economics and is an important premise upon which the Environmental Protection Agency can advance the public welfare.
Steven A. Cohen claims to argue in the eighth chapter, "EPA: A Qualified Success," that the Environmental Protection Agency "has made a
significant positive contribution to the protection of environmental quality
in the United States" (page 174). He notes that Congress has supported
the agency through expanding its statutory mandate but without providing
for commensurate staff and funding. He reports that "the air is significantly cleaner today than it was in 1970" (page 184) and that many Clean
Air Act state implementation plan revisions were late or never submitted

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

and then he concludes that "Taken as a whole the EPA's air quality
programs made a significant positive contribution to the protection of
environmental quality in the 1970s" (page 185). Cohen's implicit syllogism does not conform to standard logic. His analysis of water quality,
however, appears to be reasonable in concluding that "the EPA has made
strides toward halting increased water pollution" (page 187). In regards
to hazardous wastes, Cohen claims that because the agency developed
the Superfund legislation that the agency's performance has been "positive and significant" (page 189) even though the agency has, by Cohen's
own report, been unable to implement either the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act or the Superfund legislation (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980). Thus, he
deems the Environmental Protection Agency a "qualified success" from
"late 1970" to "21 January, 1981" (page 189). Cohen goes on to review
briefly the budget cuts, reorganization and procedural changes, and other
policy changes during the time that Anne Gorsuch-Burford was the agency's administrator. As to whether the Environmental Protection Agency
has, in fact, made "a significant positive contribution to the protection
of environmental quality in the United States" (page 174) will remain a
mystery to any reader whose sole source is Cohen's "EPA: A Qualified
Success."
Thomas G. Ingersoll and Bradley R. Brockbank address "The Role of
Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy" in the ninth chapter and
explain in ordinary language the growth of environmental regulation and
the inability of economic markets to be the premier vehicle for that
regulation. Ingersoll and Brockbank do allow that "The market system
...can be a very useful mechanism for allocating market goods and
free goods within the limits determined by an ecologically sound policy
process" (page 214) that relies on scientific research to produce standards
which would serve as limits to marketable permits for pollution discharges. These authors suggest also that the Superfund is an appropriately
fundamental change in the way that the federal government has been
dealing with the hazardous waste pollution of multiple resources and that
the federal agencies need to break down bureaucratic barriers to the
derivation of policy based on "sound ecological principles" (page 220).
They urge in their conclusion that "Our environmental policies must
ultimately be guided by ecological realities and we must devote an increasing share of available financial and scientific resources to the determination of those realities" (page 220).
Benjamin Walter and Malcolm Getz examine the "Social and Economic
Effects of Toxic Waste Disposal" in the tenth chapter. Their focus is on
the practical impact of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as
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implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency. Hazardous, including toxic, waste is defined in useful, even colorful, terms and the
bureaucratic politics underlying the classification of wastes are simply
described. Walter and Getz outline the mechanics of off-site waste disposal
and, after a questionable digression into product price effects, describe
in clear language the difficulties that waste disposal firms face in acquiring
land for their proposed disposal facilities.
Chapter eleven, Mark E. Kann's "Environmental Democracy in the
United States," is an unpersuasive diatribe aimed at Kann's bete noire,
something he labels "Big Business." The lack of intellectual rigor is
indicated by two examples: the first admittedly trivial but perhaps indicative of Kann's preference for believing something that he would like to
believe regardless of whether it is true and the second example is a
statement of his theme that would be important if it were true but which
Kann never supports in any objectively meaningful way. The first example
is that Kann implies erroneously that the National Environmental Policy
Act [NEPA] was the result of pressure from "millions of Americans" in
the "1970s" (page 257). NEPA was, in fact, enacted in 1969 as the
product of Congressional policymaking uninspired by any outstanding
popular demand. The second and more important example is Kann's
statement that "A long history of corporate neglect of the environment
and a more recent history of corporate opposition to environmental protection provide the major explanation for today's environmental crisis"
(page 259). The reader can search in vain throughout Kann's article for
any analytical measure that sorts out the degrees of contribution to environmental degradation. "Big Business" can certainly be criticized in
analytical terms towards some useful conclusion but Kann chooses instead
to create a corporate ideologist as a strawman to be lanced with Kann's
rhetoric.
Henry C. Kenski and Helen M. Ingram assess in chapter twelve "The
Reagan Administration and Environmental Regulation: The Constraint of

the Political Market." After reviewing the history of federal air and water
pollution legislation and evaluating the current state of the environment,
Kenski and Ingram note that Ronald Reagan, whether as Governor of
California or as President, has tended to take the lead provided by his
political appointees and advisers. His Presidential administration has persistently ignored to its own detriment the popular support for environmental protection and has through budget cuts greatly reduced the number
of enforcement actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency.
These authors believe that "serious damage has been done in the area of

environmental regulation" (page 293) due in part to the Reagan Administration's preference of dogma over conciliation.
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The concluding chapter, "Political Philosophy, Pragmatic Politics, and
Environmental Decision Making," is by the book's editors, Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien and Michael Clarke. After summarizing the
previous twelve chapters, the editors suggest that "the long-term trend
will likely be towards increasing regulation" (page 305). They make four
additional predictions, the first three of which they succinctly restate
before concluding with their fourth prediction that goes beyond the scope
of the preceding chapters.
Their first prediction is that the Environmental Protection Agency will
become "somewhat more activist" (page 306) partly because "there is
substantial public pressure to strengthen" the agency (page 306). Secondly, the Reagan Administration's attempt to transfer environmental
responsibilities to state and local governments "is unlikely to be a lasting
change" (page 306). "Third, despite extensive reservations concerning
the use of cost-benefit analysis as an effective device in environmental
decision making, it is likely, in the absence of generally agreed-upon
alternatives, to continue to be used" (pages 306-7). Kamieniecki, O'Brien
and Clarke therefore "expect that a somewhat less politicized EPA working in a more centralized policymaking system will be employing decisionmaking models of questionable validity" (page 307). Their fourth
prediction is that: "The recognition that environmental problems are both
national and international causes of concern will be slow in coming.
However, the internationalization of environmental problems is inevitable, and it will reflect the fact that we all live in a single biosphere"
(page 307).
CHANNING KURY
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